ECT's Structural Legitimacy Crisis in Thai Politics

Looking back at Thailand's political history, since the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) was established under the spirit of the 1947 Constitution (noted: 1997 Constitution), it was envisioned as an independent agency to reform politics by removing elections from Ministry of Interior control, which was seen as biased. Creating a new regulatory institution aimed to guarantee fair and honest access to state power. However, criticisms of the ECT's role have persisted and intensified following the 2017 Constitution, inherited from the NCPO era. Consequently, the ECT as the election manager has become a central hub of political conflict, management failures, and a crisis of confidence impacting Thai democracy.

Firstly, the structure and origin of the ECT lack credibility and harbor structural conflicts of interest with the Senate. The 5th ECT board under the 2017 Constitution, taking office between 2018 and 2028-2029, relies on the Senate as the final gatekeeper approving their appointments, despite being nominated by a selection committee and the Supreme Court plenary meeting. This creates a severe conflict of interest in the Senate collusion cases. The ECT and the Senate form a closed power loop where they mutually benefit each other. Most ECT members rely on Senate votes to secure their positions, and future board members will similarly depend on the current Senate for approval. Meanwhile, when facing allegations of Senate vote-rigging, the ECT must decide whether to prosecute over a hundred current senators in the Supreme Court. Prosecuting them could force senators to suspend duties and shift the balance of power, whereas failing to prosecute allows the same senators to remain in office and vote on future ECT appointments. This distorted oversight mechanism makes the independent agency lose public credibility entirely.

Stock photo for illustration only, not from the actual event

Beyond structural issues, the ECT's exercise of power has sparked intense public doubt. Instead of fostering transparency in anti-corruption efforts, the ECT assigned a deputy secretary-general to file criminal charges against the iLaw group for publishing documents regarding the Senate collusion case, widely seen as using lawfare to punish civil society for disclosing information. Furthermore, election management capabilities have been constantly questioned since the 2019 election, which suffered from party-list calculation formula controversies, reporting system crashes, and ballot discrepancies. In the 2023 election, despite switching to a two-ballot system, the ECT faced criticism over mismanaging billions of baht, basic errors such as wrong district codes on advance ballot envelopes, missing party names on ballots, and delayed reporting. By the 2026 election, grassroots networks like We Watch continued to report structural problems, including violations of secret ballot principles, ballot sorting errors by polling station officials, outdated voter lists, and staff obstructing observers and media from photographing tally sheets (Kor.Por.Nor. 5/18).

In summary, the ECT's crisis has escalated into a structural legitimacy crisis that undermines the foundation of Thai democracy across three key dimensions. First, it destroys faith in parliamentary systems when regulators are not neutral. Second, it locks up oversight mechanisms through mutual back-scratching between the ECT and the Senate. Third, it diminishes civil society power by using lawfare against organizations like iLaw or restricting We Watch, completely contradicting the original democratic spirit of the 1997 Constitution.

Source: Matichon Politics